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Devaluing Caregiving in Child Support
Calculations: Imputing Income to
Custodial Parents Who Stay Home with
Children
Stanton v. Abbey'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Stanton v. Abbey, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District,
significantly changed Missouri child support law by holding that, in
appropriate circumstances, a trial court may impute income to a custodial
parent who stays at home to care for minor children rather than obtaining
employment outside the home.2 The court established a multi-factor test to
assist trial courts in determining when imputation of income to a custodial
parent is proper.' However, the Stanton test has not been consistently applied
in subsequent Missouri appellate decisions, 4 and the courts of other States
have not been uniform in their treatment of the issue.' The issue of the
propriety of imputing income to a custodial parent is thus ripe for an
authoritative determination by the Missouri Supreme Court.
This Note takes the position that Stanton was incorrectly decided.
Stanton represents a dramatic departure from prior Missouri case law, and
rests on a highly questionable interpretation of the relevant statutes and court
rules.' Moreover, Stanton implicates the broader national debate on the value
of stay-at-home parenting-a decision to impute income to a parent who
works full-time caring for children significantly increases the economic costs
associated with that decision. 7 When income is imputed to a custodial parent,
the law thus expresses a strong preference for paid employment over family
care. As a matter of public policy, the law should remain neutral, respect the
private choices made by parents concerning their allocation of labor between

1. 874 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
2. Id. at 499.
3. Id. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.

5. See infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 61, 137-38 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 4

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

the household and the marketplace, and not burden the choice to engage in
full-time caregiving with additional costs. Finally, imputing income to a
custodial parent in many cases deprives the children involved of tangible
resources, thus defeating the policy of providing adequate support.8
This Note proposes an alternative solution to imputation of income to a
custodial parent, in cases where that parent has remarried. Marital/community
property concepts should be introduced into the child support calculation, so
that the total household income of the custodial parent can be considered in
the child support calculation.9 This alternative has the advantage of realism,
in that it more accurately reflects how "second families" operate.' 0
Moreover, it demonstrates an equal respect for marketplace employment and
full-time child care, consistent with the "partnership" concept of marriage
familiar to other areas of the law." The statutory groundwork for this
solution appears to have already been laid in Missouri. 2
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The marriage of Linda Gail Stanton (Mother) and Elliot Efrem Abbey
(Father) was dissolved on May 1, 1990.13

The divorce decree awarded

primary physical and legal custody of the parties' four minor children to
Mother and required Father to pay monthly child support of $562.50 per child,
a total of $2,250 per month. 4 The parties had substantial incomes: their
combined income in 1989 was approximately $185,000.'"
Mother remarried on January 31, 1992, and her new husband soon
accepted a job in the state of California. 16 Mother then initiated the instant
action by filing a motion to modify the original decree, seeking permission to
move the children to California. Father filed a cross-motion to modify,

8. See infra notes 61, 137-38 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 113-27, 139-43 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 113-122, 221 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
13. Stanton, 874 S.W.2d at 494.
14. Id. The children were born in 1980, 1982, 1984, and 1987, respectively. Id.

at 499. In the original decree, Father received periodic temporary custody as well as
additional visitation, and each party was given the right to claim two of the children

as exemptions for federal income tax purposes. Id. Mother was given the option to
insure Father's life at her expense. Id.
15. Id. at 497.
16. Id at 494. Mother's new husband's annual income was approximately

$225,000. Id. at 497.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/4
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consenting to the move, but raising numerous issues including a request for
a reduction of his child support obligation. 7
From 1990 to 1992 Mother, a physician specializing in internal
medicine, 8 earned an average annual income of $100,935."9 She ceased
practicing medicine on July 15, 1992, after the move to California.2' Mother
decided to stay at home because it was her first chance to stay home with the
children; because she saw a need to help the family make adjustments to the
new location; because she had not yet obtained a California medical license;
and because she had recently experienced a miscarriage.2 Mother had,
however, enrolled to take the California medical boards and intended to
become licensed in that state.'
The Circuit Court of St. Louis County' entered an order generally in
accordance with Father's motion.24 On the child support issue, the trial court
found "a change of circumstances so substantial and continuing" as to justify
modification of the prior decree, and reduced Father's monthly support
obligation to $308 per child, a total of $1,232 per month. In making the
modification, the trial court imputed income to Mother pursuant to Form 14,
the Missouri presumed child support calculation worksheet.26
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District,27 affirmed, holding that
the evidence supported the finding of a substantial and continuing change in
circumstances," that trial courts have discretion to impute income to an
"underemployed or unemployed custodial parent" in "appropriate

17. Id. at 494-95.

18. Id. at 499. Mother practiced medicine from 1980 until July 15, 1992. Id. at
499-500.
19. Id.
at 498. Mother's expense for a full-time housekeeper during the time she
at 500. No other details are
was a single working parent were $1,800 per month. Id.
given regarding her child care arrangements during this period, or during her first
marriage.
20. Id. at 499-500.
21. Id. at 500.
22. Id.
23. Michael F. Godfrey, J. Id.at 493.

at 495.
24. Id.
25. Id at 497.
26. Id.No detailed description of the trial court's reasoning is provided. See
infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text, explaining Missouri's child support
guidelines and Form 14.
at 494.
27. Grimm, Presiding Judge. Id.
at 497. See infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
28. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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circumstances,"'29 and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
imputing income to Mother on these facts.3"
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Context: The ParentalSupport Obligation
At early common law, the obligation of parents to support their children
appears to have been considered a mere moral obligation.3 During the
nineteenth century, however, it gradually attained the status of a legal
obligation in American case and statutory law.32 This legal duty, at least as
to fathers, was recognized in Missouri by 1882, 33 and the parental duty of
support is now well established in Missouri.34 However, awards for child
support throughout the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries were
discretionary with the court and often inadequate. Additionally, a custodial
mother seeking to enforce the father's obligation faced difficult procedural and
enforcement problems.35 Statutory law gradually replaced the common law

29. Id. at 499. See infra notes 157-89 and accompanying text.
30. Id. at 499-500. See infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text. The Court
of Appeals resolved a variety of other matters in this case, involving the finding of a
change in circumstances, custody, visitation, and responsibility for payment of
insurance premiums. Id. at 496-96, 500-02.
31. See Donna Schuele, Originsand Development of the Law of ParentalChild
Support, 27 J. FAM. L. 807, 810 & n.7 (1988-89) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Ch. 16 (1871)).

32. See generally id. at 807-816 (providing a thorough history of the early
development of child support law, with extensive citations to eighteenth and nineteenth
century cases and to the contemporary legal literature).
33. See In the Matter of Scarritt, 76 Mo. 565, 584 (1882):
As to any mere article of property, either personal or real, the law permits
a man to dispose of it, by gift or contract, as he chooses. Not so of his
children. The father owes a duty to nurture, support, educate and protect
his child, and the child has the right to call upon him for the discharge of
this duty. These obligations and rights are imposed and conferred by the
laws of nature; and public policy, for the good of society, will not permit
or allow the father to irrevocably divest himself of or to abandon them at
his mere will or pleasure.
34. JACK COCHRAN, FAMILY LAw (21 MISSOURI PRACTICE) § 10.2, at 261
(1990); Joan M. Burger, ChildSupportandMaintenance,in 1 MISSOURI FAMILY LAW
14-1, 14-2 (Missouri Bar 4th ed. 1988). See also MO. REV. STAT. §§ 452.340 and
568.040 (1994) (child support and criminal nonsupport of children). Cf Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 210.110-210.183 (1994) (child abuse and neglect).
35. See generally Schuele, supra note 31, at 816-839.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/4
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as the source of judicial authority for such awards, but the early statutes left
courts with great discretion in making awards and typically failed to set forth
effective procedures for enforcing the duty of support. 6
As divorce became increasingly common in the twentieth century, it
became clear that divorce often left children (and their custodial parent,
usually the mother) in extreme poverty, in many cases dependent upon the
government for support." In 1988, Congress responded by enacting the
Family Support Act of 1988,38 requiring every state to develop specific
guidelines for calculating presumed child support amounts, as a condition for
receiving federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children payments.39

36. Id. at 825-26 and nn.67-68. See also Peter Leehy, Note, The ChildSupport
Standards Act and the New York Judiciary: Fortifying the 17 Percent Solution, 56

BROOK. L. REV. 1299, 1304 & nn.33-35 (1991).
37. Congress recognized the importance of this problem through adoption of the

Child Support Enforcement Act as part of the Social Services Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2351 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651669 (1988)).
Numerous authors have collected and discussed the statistical data regarding the
poverty of children and women following divorce. See, e.g., Leehy, supra note 36,
at 1305-07; Loretta D. McDonald, Comment, ChildSupport Guidelines: Formulasto
Protect Our Children from Poverty and the Economic Hardships of Divorce, 23
CREIGHTON L. REV. 835, 835-38 (1990); Jennifer Clifton Ferguson, Comment,
Missouri Child Support Guidelines, 57 MO. L. REV. 1301, 1301-02 (1992); Helen
Donigan, CalculatingandDocumentingChildSupportAwards Under Washington Law,

26 GONZ. L. REV. 13, 16-18 (1990/91); Sally F. Goldfarb, Child Support Guidelines:
A Model for FairAllocation of Child Care, Medical, and EducationalExpenses, 21
FAM. L.Q. 325, 349 (1987). The disparate effects of divorce on children and on
custodial households are discussed in Carol Bruch, Developing Standardsfor Child
Support Payments: A Critique of Current Practice,16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 50-54
(1982). See also Malcolm Wallop, The Last Campaign-ChildSupport and Poverty,
1983 DET. C.L. REV. 1467.
It has also been observed that the child support reforms of the late 1980s have
not entirely resolved the national problem of children's poverty, and the rate of poverty
among children has actually risen by more than 40 percent since 1970. Marsha
Garrison, Child Support and Children'sPoverty, 28 FAM. L.Q. 475, 479-483 (1994)
(reviewing ANDREA H. BELLER & JOHN W. GRAHAM, THE ECONOMICS OF CHILD
SUPPORT (1993) and DONALD J. HERNANDEZ, AMERiCA'S CHILDREN: RESOURCES
FROM FAMILY GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY (1993)). A variety of reasons for
this, and the limitations of what government child support policy can accomplish, are
discussed in the remainder of this thoughtful book review.
38. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988).
39. Id. The history leading up to the enactment of this law, and also the earlier
Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305,
is presented in Leehy, supra note 36, at 1301-04. See also McDonald, supra note 37,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 4
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

The Missouri General Assembly responded to this mandate by directing
the Missouri Supreme Court to promulgate a guideline containing "specific,
descriptive, and numeric criteria" for computing the child support
obligation.40 The statute and guidelines create a rebuttable presumption that
the amount calculated is the correct amount to be awarded; however, the court
may award a different amount upon "a written finding or specific finding on
the record that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or
inappropriate in a particular case."'" The General Assembly has set forth by
statute the general factors which courts should consider in making an initial
43
child support award. 42 The Missouri Supreme Court, by Rule 88.01,

at 838-42. By limiting the discretion of trial judges, the guidelines were intended to
have the following effects: "(1) to bridge the 'adequacy gap' in child support awards;
(2) to improve the consistency of awards ordered; and (3) to improve the efficiency
of court award processes." Ferguson, supra note 37, at 1302. Various models the
states have employed in establishing their presumptive support guidelines have been
described in detail by several authors. Ferguson, supranote 37, at 1303-06; Goldfarb,
supra note 37, at 325-330. See generally Robert G. Williams, Guidelinesfor Selling
Levels of Child Support Orders,21 FAM. L.Q. 281 (1987); and the series of articles
collected in 1 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, IMPROVING CHILD SUPPORT PRACTICE

1-1-422 (1986).
The broader issues raised by limiting judicial discretion by rule are discussed in
Carl E. Schneider, The Tension Between Rules and Discretion in Family Law: A
Report and Reflection, 27 FAM. L.Q. 229 (1993). See also Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed
Rules and Discretionin ContemporaryFamily Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L.
REV. 1165 (1986); State ex rel. Wilcox v. Strand, 442 N.W.2d 256, 258 (S.D. 1989)
(Henderson, J., concurring).
40. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.340.7 (1994). The development of Missouri's child

support guidelines, along with an explanation of their application, is presented in
Ferguson, supra note 37, at 1306-314. For a comprehensive general overview of
Missouri child support law, see COCHRAN, supra note 34, Chapter 10 (1988 and Supp.
1994); Burger, supra note 34, §§ 14.1-14.41 (1988 and Supp. 1991).
41. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.340.8 (1994).
42. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.340.1 (1994) provides:

In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation or child
support, the court may order either or both parents owing a duty of support
to a child of the marriage to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for his
support, including an award retroactive to the date of filing the petition,
without regard to marital misconduct, after considering all relevant factors

including:
(1) The financial needs and resources of the child;
(2) The financial resources and needs of the parents;
(3) The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage
not been dissolved;
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/4
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provided that the child support amount calculated by Civil Procedure Form
1444 shall be presumed the correct amount in every case, effective April 1,

(4) The physical and emotional condition of the child, and his educational
needs.
43. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 88.01 provides:
When determining the amount of child support to order, a court or
administrative agency shall consider all relevant factors, including:
(a) the financial resources and needs of the child;
(b) the financial resources and needs of the parents;
(c) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage
not been dissolved;
(d) the physical and emotional condition of the child; and
(e) the educational needs of the child. There is a rebuttable presumption
that the amount of child support calculated pursuant to Civil Procedure
Form No. 14 is the amount of child support to be awarded in any judicial
or administrative proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation,
or child support. It is sufficient in a particular case to rebut the
presumption that the amount of child support calculated pursuant to Civil
Procedure Form No. 14 is correct if the court or administrative agency
enters in the case a written finding or a specific finding on the record that
the amount so calculated, after consideration of all relevant factors, is unjust
or inappropriate.
44. Mo. Civ. P. FORm No. 14 includes a calculation worksheet, instructions
use, and comments. Line 1 of the worksheet is "monthly gross income," and
remainder of the worksheet makes adjustments to that amount and assigns
percentage and amount of support due from each parent. The directions
completion of Line 1 of the worksheet read:
Enter one-twelfth of yearly gross income. Gross income includes income
from any source, except as excluded below, and includes but is not limited
to income from salaries, wages, overtime compensation, commissions,
bonuses, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income,
annuities, capital gains, social security benefits, retirement benefits,
workers' compensation benefits, unemployment compensation benefits,
disability insurance benefits, and spousal support actually received from a
person not a party to the order.
For income from rent, royalties, self-employment, proprietorship or a
business or joint ownership or a partnership or closely held corporation,
"gross income" is defined as gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary
expenses required to produce income. The court may exclude from
ordinary and necessary expenses amounts for depreciation, investment tax
credits, and other noncash reductions of gross receipts. Income, expenses
and retained earnings should be reviewed to determine gross income. This
amount may differ from a determination of business income for tax
purposes.

for
the
the
for

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

7

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 4
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

1990." The General Assembly has also set forth the factors to be considered
upon a motion to modify an existing award,46 and has required the use of
Form 14 in those situations as well.47 Missouri made another significant
change in child support policy in 1988, when the General Assembly deleted
as a factor to be considered in setting child support awards "the father's
primary responsibility for support of his child."4

Income earned from a second job of a sporadic or nonrecurring nature may
be included in whole or in part in appropriate circumstances.
Significant employment-related benefits received by a parent may be
counted as income.
Exclude from gross income the following: aid to families with dependent
children (AFDC) payments; medicaid benefits; supplemental security
income (SSI) benefits; food stamps; general assistance benefits; other public
assistance benefits having eligibility based on income; and child support
received for other children.
If either parent is unemployed or
underemployed, child support may be calculated in appropriate
circumstancesbasedon a determinationofpotential income. To determine
potential income, the court or administrative agency may consider
employment potential and probable earnings level based on the parent's
recentiworkhistory,occupationalqualifications,
prevailingjobopportunities
in the community, and whether that parent is custodian of a child whose
condition or circumstances make it appropriatethat the custodian not be
requiredto seek employment outside the home.
(emphasis added).
45. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 88.01.
46. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.370.1 (1994) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection 6 of section 452.325, the
provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may be
modified only upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and
continuing as to make the terms unreasonable. In a proceeding for
modification of any child support or maintenance award, the court, in
determining whether or not a substantial change in circumstances has
occurred, shall consider all financial resources of both parties, including the
extent to which the reasonable expenses of either party are, or should be,
shared by a spouse or other person with whom he or she cohabits, and the
earning capacity of a party who is not employed. If the application of the
guidelines and criteria set forth in supreme court rule 88.01 to the financial
circumstances of the parties would result in a change of child support from
the existing amount by twenty percent or more, then a prima facie showing
has been made of a change of circumstances so substantial and continuing
as to make the present terms unreasonable.
47. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.370.2 (1994).
48. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.340(1) (1986). An extensive commentary on the 1988
amendment is found in Mathieu Bregande, Comment, No Longer the Father'sPrimary
Duty to Support: Legal Equality or Economic DisparityAmong the Sexes?, 34 ST.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/4
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In the typical child support calculation, the income attributed to a parent
is the parent's actual income.49 However, even before adoption of formal
child support guidelines, the practice of imputing income to a noncustodial
parent had gained widespread acceptance in Missouri and other states.5"
Courts developed this practice, under which a court may impute income to a
parent who seeks to reduce his/her child support obligation through voluntary
unemployment or underemployment, to further the purpose of providing
adequate child support awards.5" This doctrine, as applied to noncustodial

Louis U. L.J. 133 (1989). Bregande analyzes the social and political reasons why the
legislature took this action, and whether the law comports with economic reality. Id.
at 135-143. The author concluded that Missouri acted prematurely in abolishing the
father's primary duty of support:
The Missouri Legislature's objective is something that cannot be achieved
until economic burdens on women are substantially alleviated. Since there
can be no legal parity until there is economic parity between the sexes,
lawmakers and society-at-large must cling to reality and not misleading
statistics, in order to develop sound policies and presumptions concerning
the role of spouses.
Id. at 147. But see Agnes Pek Dover, Note, FinancialEquality in Marriage and
Parenthood: Sharingthe Burdens as Well as the Benefits, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 733
(1980); Lee Ann Conti, Comment, ChildSupport: His, Her, or Their Responsibility?,
25 DEPAUL L. REV. 707 (1976).
See also Stephen D. Hoyne, Comment, ChildSupport in Missouri: The Father's
Duty, the Child's Right, and the Mother's Ability to Enforce, 36 MO. L. REV. 325
(1971) (summarizing and analyzing Missouri child support case law).
49. See, e.g., MO. CIV. P. FORM No. 14, supra note 44, directions for completing
worksheet line 1, "Monthly gross income."
50. Laura W. Morgan has collected many cases from around the country on
imputing income, illustrating the principles commonly applied and the situations in
which income is likely to be imputed, in three articles. See Laura W. Morgan,
Imputed Income: 1995 Comprehensive Update, 7 DIVORCE LITIG. 29 (1995)
[hereinafter Morgan, 1995 Update]; Laura W. Morgan, Counting What's Not There:
Recent Case Law on ImputingIncome in Spousaland Child Support Cases,4 DIVORCE
LITIG. 197 (1992); Laura W. Morgan, Update: Imputed Income, 5 DIVORCE LInG.
206 (1993).
51. The rule has drawn favorable comment from legal writers. See Bruch, supra
note 37, at 61-62 ("[T]here is a well-established support doctrine that imputes earnings,
whether or not received, to parents at the level available to them were they to make
a good faith effort to earn. This sensible doctrine has seen frequent, effective use
when threats to cease or reduce profitable employment have been made in an effort
to avoid or minimize support responsibilities."); Leehy, supra note 36, at 1336 ("By
establishing an income base that accurately reflects the parents' ability to support their
children, the courts will advance the goal of providing higher awards.").
It is thus not surprising that the majority of states take the parent's state of mind
into account in determining whether to impute income, and a good faith reason for
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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parents, has been part of Missouri law since at least 1965.52 The Missouri
Court of Appeals, Eastern District, summarized the law with regard to
imputing income in the 1994 case of Jensen v. Jensen," and the principles
have been codified in statutory law5 4 and in the instructions for completion
of Form 14." While the cases typically do not speak in terms of the
custodial/noncustodial parent distinction, it is apparent from a review of the
literature that the common law rule developed in an effort to enforce the
obligations of noncustodial parents.56
Prior to Stanton, only one Missouri appellate decision appears to have
explicitly considered the issue of imputing income to a custodial parent, and

reducing income will prevent income from being imputed in many states. Morgan,
1995 Update,supranote 50, at 43-47. Interestingly, Morgan cites Missouri cases both
for the majority view that state of mind is an important consideration, Morgan, 1995
Update, supra note 50, at 44 (citing In re Adoption of J.P.S., 876 S.W.2d 762 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1994)), and for the minority view that state of mind is irrelevant, id. at 42
(citing Luker v. Luker, 861 S.W.2d 195 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)).
See also Donigan, supra note 37, at 31-34.
52. Weiss v. Weiss, 392 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
53. 877 S.W.2d 131, 136 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (court may impute income in
proper circumstances, especially where reduction in income was voluntary, as where
the parent deliberately sought to reduce or hide income to decrease the child support
obligation, or did not in good faith attempt to gain employment). The Jensen case
itself illustrates the highly discretionary nature of the court's ability to impute income
even to a noncustodial parent, and how different courts can see the issues differently.
In Jensen, the court held that the trial court erred in imputing income of $6,000 to
father, where father had been fired by his former employer prior to the divorce, and
subsequently, with the consent of mother, had opened his own business in the same
field. Id. at 136-37. "The trial court's imputation of an income three times higher
than husband's actual earnings could force him to abandon the business, forfeit the
marital assets he received and seek employment elsewhere to meet the awards
premised on income he does not receive." Id. at 137.
See also Overstreet v. Overstreet, 693 S.W.2d 242, 245-46 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(reversing a trial court which refused to impute income to a noncustodial parent);
Crooks v. Crooks, 666 S.W.2d 33, 34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (refusing to impute income
to noncustodial parent because his unemployment was not voluntary); Ferguson, supra
note 37, at 1307 & n.72.
See generally COCHRAN, supra note 34, § 10.2, and Burger, supra note 34,
§ 14.7.
54. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.370.1, supra note 46.
55. Mo. Civ. P. FORM No. 14, supra note 44, directions for completion of
worksheet line 1, "Monthly gross income."
56. Stanton, 874 S.W.2d 493, 497 (1994). See generallyMorgan, 1995 Update,
supra note 50.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/4
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the court found that it would be inappropriate to do so.57 In Markowski v.
Markowski, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, held that a
custodial mother's failure to satisfy the expectation of achieving selfsufficiency was good cause for a downward modification of the father's
maintenance obligation.58 The court discussed at some length authority for
the "affirmative obligation" of an ex-spouse to attain self-sufficiency.59 The
court found "no proof of any mitigating condition or circumstance justifying
the wife's failure to seek or acquire any gainful employment,"60 but, using
strong language, refused to impute income to her for the purposes of child
support.
The matter of child support, however, stands on different ground.... no

evidence was offered by respondent to show any decrease in the financial
needs of the children and no actual resources available for their support
beyond those which existed at the time the decree was entered. The duty
of appellant to expend efforts at attaining self-sufficiency for herself and a
failure to meet that obligation is not a tangible resource of benefit to the
children unless and until some income materializes. For obvious, practical
reasons, the children's needs must be evaluated in terms of current
disposable income, not on expectations. The same reasons which support
an adjustment in maintenance to a lethargic spouse do not constitute
changed circumstances upon which a reduction in child support may be
ordered.6

B. The Value of Services in the Home:
Denigrationand Recognition
Before turning to the key issue presented in Stanton-whether full-time
child care can reasonably be considered "voluntary unemployment or
underemployment"-it is necessary first to consider competing assumptions
regarding the value of the work done by full-time homemakers. Because most
of these individuals historically have been, and continue to be, women, this
subject is inextricably linked to the changing status of women in the law and
society.
Historically, women have received mixed messages about the importance
of the child rearing and homemaking functions: "Their role was important,
but not worth economic compensation. Their role was valuable, but not as

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Markowski v. Markowski, 736 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).

Id. at 465-66.
Id. at 466. See infra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
Id. at 465.
Id.at 466.
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valuable as their husband's achievements outside the home."62 In many
ways, the caregiving contributions of women appear to have been discounted
or entirely taken for granted.63
In a thoughtful recent article, Professor Estin has elaborated on many of
the issues related to the difficulties which the caregiving role faces in
achieving full recognition in the law.'
Emphasizing the "remarkable
disregard for caregiving" in the law, 65 Estin observes that younger families
are now "subject to different norms of family life in which self-sufficiency
and autonomy are of primary importance."' She argues that "as courts have
focused greater attention on the goal of financial independence, caregiving
values have disappeared,"'67 and that caregiving should be given greater
'
recognition in "the economic management of divorce."68
Estin notes that the case law suggests that relatively few maintenance
awards are given to facilitate caregiving, although she cites Missouri as an
exception to this rule.69
The majority trend is to reject caregiver

62. Nanette K. Laughrey, Uniform Marital Property Act:
A Renewed
Commitment to the American Family, 65 NEB. L. REv. 120, 147 (1986). Laughrey

reviews the historical assignment of the caregiving role to women, and the economic
support role to men, within the marital relationship. Id.at 143-50.
See also Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study ofIdeology and
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497, 1499-1501 (1983).
63. See Bruch, supra note 37, at 54, observing that 1960s and 1970s era
government estimates of the cost of rearing a child did not place any value on services
in the home. "[N]o account was made for the value of personal services performed
by family members or for earnings given up while raising children." Id.Bruch goes
on to observe that estimates of the costs of raising children taken from intact families
are of limited usefulness in the post-divorce situation. Id.at 59.
64. Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance,Alimony, and the Rehabilitationof Family
Care, 71 N.C. L. REv. 721 (1993). Professor Estin's article addresses the closely
related topic of maintenance/alimony awards for the purpose of supporting the

caregiving role.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 721.
Id.at 722.
Id. See also Laughrey, supra note 62, at 148-150.
Estin, supra note 64, at 722.
Estin, supra note 64, at 728-33. Estin cites fourteen Missouri appellate

decisions, dating from 1977 to 1991, granting caregiver maintenance awards. Id.
at
729-31 & n.22. In some of these, e.g., Newport v. Newport, 759 S.W.2d 630 (Mo.

Ct. App. 1988), the mother-caregiver had a clear ability to be self-supporting, yet the
courts awarded "permanent" maintenance. Estin, supra note 64, at 730. Estin quotes
the Newport court as stating the policy that
When the parties have adopted a lifestyle in which the husband works and
the wife has stayed at home to care for small children, and, where it is
economically feasible for the wife to continue to do so after dissolution, it
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/4
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maintenance awards, or to terminate the award when the caregiver will be
"retrained" and can begin working outside the home.70 Estin concludes that
where caregiver-support statutes exist, they are seldom given effect, and that
in very few states have caregiver support awards been reversed on appeal as
insufficient."' She concludes that "[f]aced with caregivers who might
become self-supporting, judges are increasingly giving priority 'to the goal of
making divorced women self-sufficient over the goal of supporting the
custodial parent'."" She does, however, observe a distinction in the courts'
treatment of older and younger homemakers, seeing a more favorable
treatment of older homemakers in maintenance awards.73 The rationales
often given for this trend include the benefits conferred on the family over a
lifetime, and the "opportunity costs" of caregiving.74 However, this
generosity has not been extended to younger divorcing caregivers. "For
younger caregivers, the implicit presumption of an ability to be self-supporting
is effectively conclusive, overwhelming all other considerations.""

is appropriate that she not be required to seek employment outside the
home.
Estin, supra note 64, at 730-31 (quoting 759 S.W.2d at 634-45). Estin concludes that
Missouri courts appear "especially solicitous" of mothers of preschool-age children,
though they at times award caregiver maintenance to mothers of elementary school-age
children as well. Estin, supra note 64, at 731. The courts appear to assume that
children no longer need a full-time caregiver by the time they reach high school.
Estin, supranote 64, at 731. However, she notes that "in none of these cases was the
amount of maintenance and child support sufficient to support the custodian at a
standard of living comparable to that during the marriage." Estin, supra note 64, at
735 n.43 (quoting Joan M. Krauskopf, Maintenance: A Decade of Development,50

Mo. L. REv. 259, 281-82 (1985)).
Estin notes that these Missouri decisions are an exception to the majority trend,
but also cites opinions from Nebraska and Wisconsin with strong language in favor of
caregiving. Id.
at 731-32 & nn.31-37 (citing Morris v. Morris, 268 N.W.2d 431, 434
(Neb. 1978); Hartung v. Hartung, 306 N.W.2d 16 (Wis. 1981)).
70. Id. at 728-29, 733 & nn. 38-39.
71. Id. at 735 & n.42. Missouri is again noted as an exception to this rule. Id.
72. Estin, supranote 64, at 737 (quoting LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION:

THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR

WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 185-86 (1985)). See alsoNancy R. Hauserman,
Homemakersand Divorce: Problems of the Invisible Occupation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 41,

46-47 (1983).
73. Estin, supra note 64, at 738-42.
74. Estin, supranote 64, at 738-742,
75. Estin, supra note 64, at 743. Estin, not surprisingly, challenges the validity
of this distinction. Estin, supra note 64, at 744-46. She also presents an elaborate
discussion of compensatory- and restitution-based approaches which have been taken
to respond the needs of caregivers facing divorce. Estin, supra note 64, at 746-67.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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In a section of the article entitled "The Disappearance of Family Care,"
Estin notes that the "devaluation" of family care is surprising, given dominant
paradigms in our society placing caregiving "at the heart of family life."76
This "family value" seems to disappear when the household dissolves, and the
norms of self-interest re-emerge.77 She argues that two "intellectual
mistakes" have led to this result. "One mistake is the conclusion that family
care exists only in a 'traditional' homemaker/breadwinner marriage, and that
families have become obsolete. A second mistake is the assumption that
because family care is sustained by love, it has no legal, economic, or political
significance."78
Under maintenance laws that emphasize financial need due to an inability
to be self-supporting, the claim of a young caregiver, perhaps well
educated, with at most a few years' absence from the labor force, is not
particularly compelling. With relatively recent credentials and work
experience, she is unlikely to be able to cast herself in the role of the needy
and dependent spouse.78
Focusing on the law's "normative bias" favoring self-reliance, and noting the
dramatic change of attitude toward caregiving expressed in court decisions
between the 1970s and 1990s,0 Estin concludes that "[c]hild support
guidelines in some jurisdictions now virtually require that both parents of a
child will8 be in the labor force, often as early as the child's second
birthday." '
She continues with the observation that many 'depictions of homemakers
in our society are so unfavorable as to border on "caricature."82 She finds
a "conceptual generation gap," noting that increased labor force participation
by women does "not necessarily mean that caregiving and family life have lost
their significance."83 However, homemakers suffer from the "Invisibility
Problem:, 84 "In legal analysis, and in political and economic theory that
form its foundation, family care activities are irrelevant-noneconomic,

As noted above, Estin stresses the existence of "generation gaps" in the treatment of
family care decisions. Estin, supra note 64, at 768-774.
76. Estin, supra note 64, at 767.
77. Estin, supranote 64, at 768.
78. Estin, supranote 64, at 768.
79. Estin, supranote 64, at 769.
80. Estin, supranote 64, at 770-71.
81. Estin, supra note 64, at 771.
82. Estin, supra note 64, at 772.
83. Estin, supra note 64, at 773-74.
84. Estin, supra note 64, at 774-79.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/4
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nonpolitical, and legally unimportant.""5 Caregiving has not been adequately
86
recognized historically, and Estin concludes that it is even less so today.
If done properly, household work is often entirely taken for granted."
Despite its economic, social, and familial importance, the work of
caregiving remains invisible to lawyers and judges because the law
construes family care as a matter of love and obligation, not a matter of
personal choice or arms' length bargaining.

This is characteristic of

attitudes even within the family, where caregiving is largely invisible. By
its very nature, nurturance is supposed to be silent, hidden, selfless, and
self-effacing-"something different" from work. 8
Estin observes that current debate has assigned both "political and moral

significance" to private choices concerning caregiving roles, and she finds a
"deep social ambivalence" on these questions.89
The polarities of public opinion on family issues make it difficult to affirm
the value of caregiving without seeming to reject or denigrate the many

other roles women play, and make it equally difficult to affirm the
importance of work and financial contribution without seeming to reject the
human values of family care.
Estin concludes by arguing for the "rehabilitation" of family care in the
law, focusing on the importance of the caregiving role.92 She comments
on research showing the value of family care to children;93 research
indicating some level of "risk" to children associated with being placed in day
care;94 the importance of caregiving to older children;95 and the difficulties
91

85. Estin, supra note 64, at 774.
86. Estin, supra note 64, at 774-75.
87. Estin, supra note 64, at 776-77.
88. Estin, supra note 64, at 776. These sentiments echo those expressed in
Laughrey, supra note 62, at 145-47.
89. Estin, supra note 64, at 779.
90. Estin, supra note 64, 779.
91. Estin, supra note 64, at 781-85. Estin discusses how the roles and tasks of
homemakers play out in different family scenarios, including "the permanent
homemaker," "temporary homemakers and the Mommy Track," "two job/two career
couples," and "single parent caregiving." Estin, supra note 64, at 781-91.
92. Estin, supra note 64, at 791-802.
93. Estin, supra note 64, at 792-93 & nn. 274-80.
94. Estin, supra note 64, at 793-95 & nn. 281-83.
95. Estin, supra note 64, at 795-96 & nn. 291-94.
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and risks faced by women in making life choices.96 Stressing the need for
tolerance and social pluralism in a diverse society, Estin makes the case for
maintenance to allow a family which has made a primary caregiving choice
to continue.97
A rehabilitation of family care proceeds from three principles. First,
although the costs and benefits of caregiving are most evident in households
with a "traditional" division of labor, they appear in different forms in
virtually every family. Second, the burdens and rewards of family life are
not limited in time to the duration of the marriage. Third, what is valuable
within a family is not autonomy and self-reliance, but interdependence and
98

support.

In Estin's view, these values require recognition of the caregiver role in all
family types. 99
Of course, Estin's opinions are not universally held. In addition to the
devaluation of the caregiving function in the law and "mainstream" society,
it has been widely observed that a significant element of the feminist
movement has expressed a strong disdain for the traditional housewife's
Although this view is not universal within the feminist
role."°
movement,' the "equality" model of feminism minimizes a commitment to
homemaking as a "lifestyle choice," and tends to view non-financially self-

96. Estin, supra note 64, at 797-99.
97. Estin, supra note 64, at 800-02. Estin argues that
Divorce law is not an appropriate lever for producing change in the nature
of family life. There is no social consensus about the wisdom or value of
moving toward gender-neutral marriage, in which family care and market
labor are equally allocated. Even if most Americans agreed with this as a
policy goal, it would be in the greater interests of our society to continue
to support family life in all its varied forms.
Estin, supra note 64, at 800.
98. Estin, supra note 64, at 801.
99. Estin, supra note 64, at 802.
100. See, e.g., F. Carolyn Graglia, The Housewife as Pariah,18 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 509 (1995).

101. There is a "cultural feminist" perspective, which values caregiving and
objects to the practice of viewing housewives as victims. Estin, supranote 64, at 74344 n.76 (citing June Carbone and Margaret F. Brinig, RethinkingMarriage: Feminist
Ideology, Economic Change, and DivorceReform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 996 (1991)).

Estin also describes a "post-feminist" perspective, placing an increased emphasis on
caregiving, or at least questioning the absence of a focus on working mothers by the
leaders of the women's movement. Estin, supra note 64, at 778-79 & nn.216-17.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/4
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supporting women as "victims."' 02
Feminists have at times endorsed
government economic policies disfavoring women who choose to stay home
with children. 3
Some pointed criticisms have been leveled at feminism's devaluation of
the homemaker's role. In a recent article, Graglia writes that
Feminists... undertook to re-educate these homemakers by disabusing
them of such quaint notions as to their own worth and the value of
domesticity. With no forum from which to speak, and perhaps stunned that
they needed defense, women surrendered feminine domestic values to
masculine work-oriented values, as those who purported to champion
women proclaimed the superiority and glamour of market production.'
She challenges the feminist viewpoint that market production is somehow
more worthy than family care, and also challenges the assumption that women
who enter the marketplace are actually better off.0 5 She concludes that
Through its war against the homemaker, feminism has inflicted undeserved
injury upon many good women and weakened society by curtailing a female
activity that contributes, possibly more than any other, to familial health and
stability. Some women reject feminism's message that a mother's personal
attention to child-rearing cannot be a full-time, gratifying occupation, but
only a sort of improvisation, peripheral to her market activities .. 0
Dominant feminist ideology has also been criticized as upscale, and as seeking
to "liberate" women by denying their obligations to children. 7 FoxGenovese contends that the dominant feminist ideology is pertinent only to
upscale, "careerist" women, not to the majority of working-class women faced
with difficult choices. 10 8

102. Estin, supra note 64, at 743-44 n.76 (citing Carbone & Brinig, supra note
101, at 996).
103. Graglia, supra note 100, at 517; Estin, supra note 64, at 778 n.15 (citing
Herma Hill Kay, Equality andDifference: A Perspectiveon No-FaultDivorce and its
Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 80 (1987)).
104. Graglia, supra note 100, at 516.
105. Graglia, supra note 100, at 517-19 ("Why is it worthy, even ecstatic, to be
a lawyer who ends marriages, or a politician who reforms society, or a social worker
who repairs broken families, but not worthy to try to raise a family not in need of
repair and preserve and cultivate a marriage that does not dissolve?").
106. Graglia, supra note 100, at 521.
107. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Feminism, Childrenand the Family, 18 HARv. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 503, 504-08 (1995).
108. Id.at 505-07. Cf the comment of Burger, supra note 34, § 14.14, on the
limitations of the use of statutory guidelines for child support purposes: "Most divorce
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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One point on which there is apparent consensus is that a fundamental
problem encountered in seeking to recognize the value of the caregiving role
is the difficulty of establishing a market value for the childrearing and
household functions provided by homemakers."(9 Significant difficulties are
encountered in quantifying both the value of the services provided by such
persons,"' and the costs they incur personally by choosing to provide
them."' However, there is agreement that both the value and the costs are

litigants have incomes which are at best barely adequate to supply their necessities
when the family is living as a single unit."
109. See generally Olsen, supra note 62, at 1499-1501 (developing the thesis that
the sharp ideological dichotomy between the family and the marketplace has had a
profound effect on people's perspectives). Olsen comments that reforms intended to
improve the lot of women often also foster individual selfishness, while reforms
encouraging "altruistic behavior" within the family tend to reinforce traditional sex
hierarchy. Thus, no single reform is likely to be adequate "for creating democratic,
sharing relationships among people." Olsen, supra note 62, at 1560-61.
On a less theoretical level, Hauserman, supra note 72, at 41-43 & nn.6-10, cites
studies on the number of hours devoted to household work, and the types of tasks
involved. "Clearly, the 43 million women in the labor force and the 40 million
homemakers are both involved in 'work.' The obvious difference remains-the
homemakers do not receive an income." Hauserman, supra note 72, at 43. Since
there is no marketplace for the homemaker's services, they are not typically measured
as a part of family income. Hauserman, supra note 72, at 43.
Karen Czapanskiy, Giving Credit Where Credit is Due, in WOMEN'S LEGAL
DEFENSE FUND, CRITICAL ISSUES, CRITICAL CHOICES: SPECIAL ToPicS IN CHILD
SUPPORT GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT 141 (1986), argues for the recognition of the

noneconomic contributions of the custodial parent in developing child support
guidelines. Id.at 142. She states that "traditional" strict "gender-based divisions of
labor" are no longer accepted, and that both parents are capable of earning money, and
of providing nurturance to children. Id. However, the parent who provides "a
disproportionate share of the nurturance" faces economic disadvantages, and practical
job difficulties. Id.at 144-45. She concludes that whether the custodial parent is the
father or the mother, that parent bears the bulk of the nurturing burden, and argues for
child support guidelines that explicitly take the nurturing responsibility into account.
Id at 148-51.
See also Elizabeth R. Tyndall, Note, HomemakerServicesand the Elective Share:
Out of the Kitchen and Into the Money, 52 MO. L. REV. 697, 713 & nn.82-87 (1987).
110. See Hauserman, supra note 72, at 41-43; Czapanskiy, supra note 109, at 14344; Richard A. Posner, ConservativeFeminism, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 191, 192 n.4.
111. See Estin, supra note 64, at 746-52. Estin notes that the financial costs of
caregiving include both the long-term costs associated with the failure to develop a
career, and the short-term costs of lost income from employment. Estin, supra note
64, at 747. While it is difficult to quantify the opportunity costs of homemaking, or
"to allocate the parties' earning differential among its different causes," she contends
that the opportunity costs of caregiving fall disproportionately on women due to
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/4

18

1996]

DeMarce: DeMarce: Devaluing Caregiving in Child Support Calculations:
CHILD SUPPORTCALCULATIONS

differential opportunities in the labor market. Estin, supra note 64, at 751-52.
For a similar argument, with attempts to calculate the dollar value of the
opportunity costs of foregone employment, see Czapanskiy, supranote 109, at 144-46.
See also Isabel V. Sawhill, Developing Normative Standards for Child-Support
Payments, in 1 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, IMPROVING CHILD SUPPORT PRACTICE

1-119, 1-127-38 (1986).
The problems associated with attempts to place a market value on the value of
a homemakers' services may be most vividly illustrated in the context of the tort claim
for wrongful death. See generallyW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON

ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 952-53 & n.87 (5th ed. 1984). Prosser observes that
Where pecuniary loss to survivors is still the ostensible market standard for
recovery, the decedent who is not in the labor market has presented a
special problem, since the person is not making direct money contributions
to survivors, and there is certainly no direct pecuniary loss. Yet it has
almost always seemed unjust to say that a child, or nonworking wife or
mother, or an aged person is worth nothing to the survivors, and juries have
at times rendered substantial verdicts in such cases. A leading decision of
the Michigan Court many years ago held that the "pecuniary value" of a
child must include such intangibles as contributions to family life, and
apparently, that there need be no deduction for the cost of rearing the child.
Though not all courts have accepted this last point, there is very broad
agreement that the recovery should include damages for the loss of society
and companionship, which, as already noted, may be substantial. The
insistence, however, that such intangibles are in some manner "pecuniary"
losses, coupled with the approval of large verdicts for such items, may
invite the jury to leave its respect for the administration of justice at the
courthouse door. Whether that is true or not, the "pecuniary" standard
seems to permit or encourage wildly erratic verdicts because some juries
take the term literally while others accept the tacit invitation to make an
award for bereavement, and it might be better to drop the pecuniary loss
requirement altogether.
Id. at 953-53.
Despite the "wildly erratic verdicts" referred to by Prosser, it appears that
wrongful death awards continue to be larger, on average, for employed wives than for
homemakers. Estin, supra note 64, at 774 n.197 (citing Gail D. Cox, JuriesPlace
Less Value on Homemakers,NAT'L L.J., Sept. 14, 1992, at 1, 38-39).
Various authors have contended that homemakers are routinely undervalued in
wrongful death verdicts. In an early article, Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., How Much is a
Good Wife Worth?, 41 B.U. L. REV. 328 (1961), Lambert criticized the tendency of
courts to award small verdicts in wrongful death verdicts for homemakers, and praised
the decision in Legare v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 557 (S.D. Fla. 1961), in which
the trial judge upheld a verdict of $125,000 in such a case. Id. at 328-335. Lambert
also reviewed several other decisions awarding substantial verdicts in such cases. Id.
A more recent article notes the increasing use of expert testimony to establish the
value of a homemaker's services. George V. Launey, Late 'Good Wife' Revisited:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

19

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 4
MISSOURI L4W REVIEW

[Vol. 61

substantial, and that women often invest more human capital into the marriage
relationship and stand to lose more from divorce." 2
Despite the various difficulties which impede achieving legal recognition
of the caregiving role, the law has given homemakers increasing recognition,
and consequently concrete benefits, in some areas. Much of this progress has
An
been based on the emerging "partnership" concept of marriage."'
Levine
by
Justice
Beryl
eloquent statement of this doctrine has been offered
of the Supreme Court of North Dakota:".4
Marriage is now commonly perceived as an economic partnership, in which
each partner assumes a variety of duties, acceptable to each other, whether
or not conforming to traditional expectations. . . .Indeed, "working
women," i.e., those employed outside the home, and home-bound childcaring fathers are but some of the permutations that we see in these marital
relationships. So, if a married couple, i.e., the partnership, decides that
mother will stay home to perform child-care, father-care, home-care,
community-care, etc., while father will earn an income from employment
outside the home, the integrity of the partnership remains the same. There

AppraiSalofHousewife's Services, 29 REs GEsTAE 306 (1985). The author notes the
difficulty of not having an established market for a housewife's services, and employs
a statistical approach to quantify the wrongful death verdict value of a hypothetical
housewife with two children at between $460,000 and $765,000. Id.at 306, 308.
However, Launey notes that this figure purports to estimate only the value of services
which could be purchased in the market:
The methodology presented is only relevant for appraising the
economic aspects of a housewife/mother's role. The approach overlooks
completely the non-economic aspects such as companionship, love and
affection, and consortium.
If one can place a dollar value on these non-economic contributions,
it would exist over and above the measurable economic appraisal of the
work itself. Also, if the housewife were employed in the labor market
outside of the home, a conventional appraisal of her market salary would
be added to the estimates of the present value of her housewifely services.
1d at 309.
112. See generally Lloyd Cohen, Marriage,Divorce, and Quasi Rents; or, "I
Gave Him the Best Years of My Life," 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267 (1987); Margaret F.
Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriageand Divorce, 62 TUL. L.
REV. 855 (1988). See also Czapanskiy, supra note 109, at 142-149.
113. See generally Laughrey, supra note 62, at 121-131; Joan M. Krauskopf &
Rhonda C. Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and
InequitableLaw of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L. J. 558, 586-600 (1974). See also Leehy,
supra note 36, at 1342-45.
114. Spilovoy v. Spilovoy, 488 N.W.2d 873, 878-79 (N.D. 1992) (Levine, J.,
concurring specially) (citations omitted).
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is no less an economic partnership than when both parents work outside the
home. Ordinarily, in a marriage of some duration, equal value is
attributable to each party's contributions to the marital enterprise.... The
labor of child-care, home-care and all other care thus constitutes "value."
Consequently ...the mother's use of the living quarters is not one that is
without "charge" or one that is for "less than customary charge." The
mother "pays for" her living quarters with her contribution of labor, as does
the father. Whether we view the value of the labor expended in fulfilling
household duties as a setoff against the rent or whether we view it as a
payment for rent thereby removing it from the "no-charge" definition of inkind income [as set forth in North Dakota child support guidelines], I am
not sure. But I am sure that the [child support] guideline must not be
interpreted to demean the valuable contribution of labor made by at-home,
child caring and/or spouse caring spouses." 5
The "partnership" concept was adopted by the drafters of the Uniform Marital
Property Act (UMPA), which seeks to govern property rights during the
marriage (replacing the common law separate property system with a statute
incorporating many community property principles), but not to govern the
division of property upon death or divorce. 1 6 In an article arguing for the
adoption of the UMPA by the states,117 Professor Laughrey contends that
the partnership principles embodied in the UMPA recognize the importance
of the homemaker/caregiverrole in the family, and gives families the freedom
to decide how to allocate work." 8

115. Id.
116. Laughrey, supra note 62, at 132-33.
117. Laughrey, supra note 62, at 150-160.
118. Laughrey, supra note 62, at 148-150. Laughrey writes:
At one time the second-class status of the nurturing role did not
substantially affect family stability. Women had to assume that role by
virtue of law and social pressures. As women learn to make choices, it is
now necessary for the law to reinforce the importance of nurturing. It is
not in the best interest of society for women to discard their values in order
to succeed in a male-dominated culture. For women this would be the
ultimate loss of identity, and society would lose a different but valuable
perspective. The "female" values must receive increased recognition by the
whole society. They can no longer be the basis of discriminatory treatment.
If our legal and social institutions continue to punish individuals who
assume the role of nurturer, both men and women will be discouraged from
performing these tasks. It is no longer enough for jurists to talk about how
important the family is. It is now necessary that the laws be changed to
insure that neither spouse suffers economically because they have performed
caregiving functions.
Laughrey, supra note 62, at 150.
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While historically partnership concepts enjoyed some success in the law
of divorce with respect to alimony/maintenance awards, the trend in the law
has been to move away from caregiver maintenance awards toward an ideal
of self-sufficiency." 9 However, partnership concepts have found a warmer
reception in the law of equitable distribution of property upon divorce. 2 '
It has been argued forcefully, however, that the homemakers' role has been
consistently undervalued for this purpose and that equal property division may
not be adequate to support the ex-spouse in the absence of maintenance.' 2 '
While partnership concepts have apparently not made great inroads in the law
of child support, the argument has been advanced that a spouse's noneconomic
contributions should
be explicitly considered in setting child support
2
obligations as well.

1

119. See supranotes 65-81 and accompanying text. Estin, supranote 64, at 72728 discusses the historical acceptance of the importance of"caregiving" as an alimony
issue. She further observes the adoption in several states of the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act approach which explicitly includes as a factor in maintenance
considerations whether the party seeking maintenance is the custodian of a child
"whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be
requiredto seek employment outside the home." Laughrey, supra note 62, at 727 &

n.15. Missouri is one of the states which has adopted this language. Laughrey, supra
note 62, at 727 n.16 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.335.1(2) (Supp. 1991)).
120. Laughrey, supra note 62, at 130-31, notes that the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, while not widely adopted, has had a great influence on the states through
its provision explicitly directing the court to take into account "the contributions made
by a homemaker in acquisition of marital property. The basic premise of the UMDA
was that marriage is a partnership that accumulates property. When that partnership
dissolves, each partner is entitled to a share of the property." Laughrey, supra note
62, at 131. At the time Laughrey wrote in 1986, she reported that judges in all but
one of the 42 common-law property states had power to distribute property upon
divorce regardless of title. Laughrey, supra note 62, at 131 (citing Freed & Walker,
FamilyLaw in the Fifty States: An Overview, 18 FAM. L.Q. 369, 392 (1985)).

See also Estin, supra note 64, at 746-767 (discussing equitable division of
property upon divorce and the various theoretical rationales advanced for this practice).
121. Hauserman, supra note 72, at 47-53.
122. Leehy, supra note 36, at 1342-50. Leehy contends that "[ihere exists in
family law... an intrinsic link between noneconomic contributions in the context of

both equitable distribution and child support." Leehy, supra note 36, at 1345
(analyzing New York law). He finds it "incongruous" that courts give so much less
weight to noneconomic contributions in setting the child support obligation. Leehy,
supra note 36, at 1346-49. Leehy concludes that an increased flow of funds to the
custodial parent from the noncustodial resulting from this approach is consistent with
the purposes of the New York child support statute. "Judicial failure to carefully
consider similar parental contributions to the child's welfare would be inconsistent and
unfair." Leehy, supra note 36, at 1350.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/4
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"Partnership" concepts of marriage have also influenced the law of
decedents' estates through the widespread adoption of spousal elective share
statutes."2 Common law dower came to be seen as inadequate in that it
typically did not provide sufficient income to a surviving widow, it provided
only a life estate in the property the widow received, and it made possible
effective disinheritance of the surviving spouse.'24 Elective share statutes
sought to remedy this situation by entitling a surviving spouse to outright
ownership of a guaranteed share of the decedent spouse's estate, regardless of
the state of title or of the provisions of the will, thus guaranteeing some
measure of financial recognition to a homemaker's contributions to the marital

See also Goldfarb, supra note 37, at 339 (finding it "inconsistent to reimburse a
custodial parent in whole or in part for the expense of paid child care while denying
her any financial recognition for the value of the care she herself provides");
Czapanskiy, supra note 109, at 142-51.
But see Estin, supra note 64, at 791 & n.272, offering a point of view which
counters part of the force of this argument. "Caring for children often fulfills deep
human needs for caregivers themselves." Estin, supra note 64, at 791.
To look at responsibility for children only as a burden to be allocated is to
miss the primary significance of children and parenthood in many adult
lives.

See Louis GENEVIE & EVA MARGOLIES, THE MOTHERHOOD

REPORT: How WOMEN FEEL ABOUT BEING MOTHERS (1987). The
pleasures of caregiving have become a common topic for newspaper
columnists. See, e.g., PHYLLIS CHESLER, WITH CHILD: A DIARY OF
MOTHERHOOD (1979) (providing a dailyjoumal of pregnancy and first year
of parenthood); BOB GREENE, GOOD MORNING MERRY SUNSHINE (1984)
(describing the first year of parenthood in daily journal form); Anna
Quindlen, Mother's Choice, MS., Feb. 1988, at 55. The same deep pleasure
in parenthood is depicted even in those first person accounts that emphasize
the hectic and pressured quality of life for parents with multiple roles. E.g.,
Sam Davidson, HavingItAll, ESQUIRE, June 1984, at 54, 60 ("All my time
is spent on three things: baby, work, and keeping the marriage going. I
find I can handle two beautifully ... But three pushes me to the edge.").
Id. at 791 n.272. The power of this perspective is reinforced by the common sense
observation, that many parents fight over child custody because they want the
opportunity to be involved in caregiving, and to experience the deep personal rewards
which go with it. See generally ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN,
DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 99-114,267-271

(1992).
123. See Laughrey, supra note 62, at 127-28 & nn.38-43; Tyndall, supra note
109, at 698-99 & nn.10-17; Diane M. Lloyd, Comment, New Hope for the Survivor:
The Changes in the Usufructof the SurvivingSpouse, 28 LOY. L. REV. 1095, 1097-98
and nn.17-21 (1982).
124. Laughrey, supra note 62, at 127-28; Tyndall, supra note 109, at 699.
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wealth. 2 ' Missouri adopted a broad view of the partnership concept of
marriage in the case of Estate of Leve v. Leve, 26 "the first case in the nation
to hold that homemaking services may constitute a full consideration when
calculating the deceased's augmented estate" under a Uniform Probate Codetype statute.' 27
The worth which the law places on a caregiver's services assumes
immediate relevance in the context of the decision whether to impute income
to a caregiver spouse who works full-time in the home. The casual observer
might conclude that by imputing income to a caregiving parent, the judge is
recognizing the economic value of such work. However, the reverse is true:
imputation of income treats caregiving as the equivalent of voluntary
unemployment, and imposes a direct economic cost on the caregiver and child
by reducing the child support obligation of the noncustodial parent.
If caregiving is indeed seen as an inappropriate, or less productive, role
in modem society, courts will be more inclined to impute against the caregiver
spouse income that she could have earned in the marketplace. However, if a
full-time caregiving role is considered both worthy and economically valuable,
courts will be unlikely to find the full-time caregiver "voluntarily unemployed
or underemployed." The next sub-section considers the stance taken toward
this issue in a number of states, and an alternative approach which would
permit courts to give recognition to the caregiving role, while still making a
realistic accounting of the total income available to a remarried custodial
parent.

125. Laughrey, supra note 62, at 127-28.
126. 704 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (noted in Tyndall, supra note 109).
127. Tyndall, supra note 109, at 697. Tyndall writes that "Leve holds that
homemaking services may be considered as contribution in money's worth toward the
acquisition of jointly held property for the purpose of valuing the decedent's estate
from which the surviving spouse may take an elective share." Tyndall, supranote 109,
at 697. "The Leve holding states the proposition that homemaking services are worth
valuing in the context of probate law. This holding is consistent with developments
in family law, which recognize the value of the homemaker's contribution to the
marital partnership." Tyndall, supra note 109, at 710. Tyndall notes that the Leve
holding can increase the amount of property that a surviving spouse-homemaker may
elect to take against the will. Tyndall, supranote 109, at 710-11. "The Leve holding
equalizes the positions of each spouse in relation to the other, in that both spouses
receive credit for their contribution toward the acquisition ofjoint property, regardless
whether the contribution was in money or money's worth." Tyndall, supranote 109,
at 711. However, Tyndall recognizes that the Leve holding creates new questions.
"[L]acking empirical means to value homemaking services, probate courts are left to
borrow family law concepts in determining the worth of a spouse's contribution as a
homemaker." Tyndall, supra note 109, at 713.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/4
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C. Imputing Income to a CustodialParent-Caregiver
The subject of imputation of income to a custodial parent for the
purposes of child support calculations has not yet attracted a great deal of
interest in the legal scholarly literature, 2 ' and decisions from other states
addressing the subject are far from uniform. State statutes and other rules
governing child support often do not clearly address the issue of whether
imputation of income to a custodial parent is proper.'29 However, some
general patterns emerge from a review of the case law.
The majority of decisions appear to reflect the broader family law trend
of according trial judges broad discretion to make decisions based on the
totality of the circumstances in each case. 3 Numerous decisions of this
type can be found, both permitting and refusing to permit imputation of
income to a caregiver-parent, depending on the factual settings.'
A

128. The topic is, however, beginning to draw attention in the practitioners'
literature. See the articles by Morgan, supra note 50. See also Family Law Note,
Applying State ChildSupportGuidelinesto MilitaryCompensation,ARMY LAW., Nov.
1991, at 40, 42 (alerting military lawyers to the possibilities of using this doctrine to
reduce a noncustodial parent's child support obligation).
129. See Morgan, 1995 Update,supra note 50, at 30-31 (reviewing the language
of numerous state child support statutes concerning determination of income). These
statutes frequently employ broad terms like "earning capacity," "voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed," "potential income," or "voluntarily impoverished," but
do not provide guidance as to whether full-time caregivers are to be considered within
these categories. See also Leehy, supra note 36, at 1331-32 (re New York law: "The
statute makes no specific reference to imputing income to an able custodial parent who
refuses to work.")
See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.370.1, supra note 46; MO. CIV. P. FORM No.
14, Directions for Completion, Worksheet line 1, supra note 44. But see VA. CODE
ANN. § 20.108.1(B)(3) (West Supp. 1992) (cited in Morgan, 1995 Update, supranote
50, at 30-31) (the court shall consider "imputed income to a party who is voluntarily
unemployed or voluntarily under employed; provided that income may not be imputed
to the custodial parent when a child is not in school, child care services are not
available and the cost of such child care services are not included in the computation");
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 315.9 (West 1991) (cited in Morgan, 1995 Update,supranote
50, at 40) (removing a custodial parent caring for a child of the parties under the age
of five years from the class of persons who may be considered "voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed"); Stowe v. Stowe, 617 So. 2d 161, 163 (La. Ct. App.
1993) (strictly applying Louisiana exception).
130. See generally Schneider, supra note 39.
131. Cases taking this "totality of the circumstances" approach, and imputing
income to the caregiver-parent include Canning v. Juskalian, 597 N.E.2d 1074, 107679 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (interpreting Massachusetts child support guidelines as
providing express support for imputing income to a custodial parent, and refusing to
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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construe an exception for "a custodial parent with children who are under the age of
six living in the home" to include the child of the custodial parent's subsequent
marriage); In re Marriage of Gebhardt, 783 P.2d 400, 404 (Mont. 1989); In re
Marriage of Beyer, 789 P.2d 468, 469 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Brody v. Brody, 432
S.E.2d 20, 21-23 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (cited in Morgan, 1995 Update, supranote 50,
at 40) (placing burden of proof that income should not be imputed on custodial mother
who left employment to stay at home with children); Sledge v. Sledge, 630 So. 2d
461, 462 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (cited in Morgan, 1995 Update, supranote 50, at 40)
(deferring to trial court's evaluation of the facts); Marshall v. Marshall, 596 So. 2d
675, 675 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (cited in Morgan, 1995 Update, supranote 50, at
40); Gertcher v. Gertcher, 620 A.2d 454, 454 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992) (cited
in Morgan, 1995 Update, supra note 50, at 40); Guskjolen v. Guskjolen, 499 N.W.2d
126, 128-29 (N.D. 1993) (cited in Morgan, 1995 Update, supra note 50, at 40)
(income may be imputed to noncustodial parent who voluntarily left employment to
care for child of subsequent marriage); Muller v. Muller, 524 N.W.2d 78, 82-86 (Neb.
Ct. App. 1994) (cited in Morgan, 1995 Update,supra note 50, at 40) (same). Cf the
earlier decision of Mears v. Mears, 213 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Iowa 1973) (cited in
Morgan, 1995 Update, supra note 50, at 47) (refusing to find a change in
circumstances warranting and increase in child support payments after custodial parent
remarried and assumed full-time housewife duties).
Cases refusing to impute income to a custodial parent under a "totality of the
circumstances" analysis include Stredny v. Gray, 510 A.2d 359, 362-65 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986) (using strong language indicating a preference against imputing income to a
custodial parent); Singleton v. Waties, 616 A.2d 644, 647 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(same); Hesidenz v. Carbin, 512 A.2d 707, 710 (Pa. Super Ct. 1986) (same); Spilovoy
v. Spilovoy, 488 N.W.2d 8739 878 (N.D. 1992) (noting lack of clear legislative
guidance in the matter); Herron v. Herron, No. 1824-93-1, 1994 WL 115841 (Va. Ct.
App. Apr. 5, 1994); State ex rel. Wilcox v. Strand, 442 N.W.2d 256, 257-58 (S.D.
1989); Doyle v. Doyle, 579 So. 2d 651, 653 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991); Goldman v.
Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 860, 862-65 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (cited in Morgan, 1995
Update, supra note 50, at 47) (reversing trial court); Rock v. Rock, 587 A.2d 1133,
1142 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (cited in Morgan, 1995 Update, supra note 50, at 47);
Cressend v. Cressend, 514 So. 2d 225, 226-27 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (cited in Morgan,
1995 Update, supra note 50, at 40); In re Marriage of Pote, 847 P.2d 246, 247-48
(Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (cited in Morgan, 1995 Update, supra note 50, at 40); In re
Marriage of Cress, 850 P.2d 383, 384-85 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (cited in Morgan, 1995
Update, supra note 50, at 40); Barr v. Barr, 514 So. 2d 4, 4-5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (Wentworth, J., concurring).
See also Caskey v. Pratt, 540 So. 2d 253, 254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (citing
statute giving court discretion not to impute income to custodial parent where court
finds it "necessary" for parent to stay home with child).
The unsettled nature of the law in this area is illustrated by presence of opinions
from different panels or divisions of the same appellate court, taking differing
approaches to this issue. The most striking divergence is that between Thomas v.
Thomas, 589 A.2d 1373, 1374 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991) (refusing to impute
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/4
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minority view refuses to permit imputation of income in these cases, as a
matter of law."' Another minority permits imputation only upon a showing
of "bad faith" by the custodial parent."' At the other end of the spectrum,
there appears to be a minority view which almost automatically imputes
income to a custodial parent, at least where that parent has voluntarily left an

income to custodial parent as a matter of law), and Gertcher v. Gertcher, supra.
132. Thomas v. Thomas, 589 A.2d 137, 137 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991). The
court there refused to impute income to a noncustodial parent, who was staying at
home to care for the two young children of her new marriage. Id The court used
strong language:
Here, defendant is not engaged in the job market because she is fulfilling
a unique and important role in providing a nurturing environment for her
extremely young children. In this regard, it is important to note that
plaintiff is not unemployed. She is employed on a full-time basis as a care
giver to her young children. This employment is, however, not
compensated monetarily. Moreover, plaintiff's decision to remain at home
with her two-month old and three-year old sons is entitled to great
deference. While the costs and benefits of such a decision to stay at home
may be fairly debated, no court should overrule a parent's decision in that
regard or punish the decision by the imposition of a monetary award.
Id. The court invoked federal constitutional rationales for its decision, calling
imputation of income in this situation "an impermissible intrusion into an area typically
considered beyond the State's reach." Id (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979)).
In short, employment as a mother and caregiver is different in quality from
voluntary unemployment. While the latter does not excuse an obligation to
support children monetarily, the former does. To rule otherwise would, in
effect, determine that monetary contributions to children living with another
is more important than providing care to children in the obligor's custody.
I am not prepared to do so.
Id. See also Atkinson v. Atkinson, 616 A.2d 22, 23-24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(appearing to make rule that income should not be imputed to custodial parent absolute
under "nurturing parent doctrine"). But see id. at 24-25 (Del Sole, J., dissenting)
(arguing for discretion).
133. Cases of this type include Keplinger v. Keplinger, 839 S.W.2d 566,568 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1992) (reversing trial court); In re Marriage of Keown, 587 N.E.2d 644, 648
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (cited in Morgan, 1995 Update, supra note 50, at 47); McDonald
v. Taylor, 415 S.E.2d 81, 85 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (cited in Morgan, 1995 Update,
supra note 50, at 47).
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employment situation to stay home with children. 3 4 Other relevant
distinctions have also been suggested.'35
Only two law review articles have directly addressed the topic of
imputing income to a custodial parent. Professor Nickerson expresses
concerns about the validity of determining "voluntary underemployment or
unemployment" in this context, 36 and Professors Nickerson and Donigan
both comment on the financial difficulties which application of the doctrine
can create for custodial parents and children, especially where the courts do
not compensate the custodial parent for the additional costs of child care

134. In re Jonas, 788 P.2d 12, 13 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (cited in Morgan, 1995
Update, supranote 50, at 47) (reversing a trial court which refused to impute income

to a custodial mother who chose to stay at home to care for her children: "No matter
how legitimate their reasons ... each [parent] is accountable for earnings foregone in
making the choice to be unemployed. Although their reasons are different, their status
is the same: each is unemployed for personal, albeit legitimate, reasons. The trial
court erred in refusing to determine and consider [mother's]earning capacity.");
Roberts v. Roberts, 496 N.W.2d 210, 211-13 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (cited in Morgan,
1995 Update, supra note 50, at 40); In re Marriage of Noel, 875 P.2d 358, 359-60
(Mont. 1994) (income must be imputed to custodial parent at least at minimum wage
less cost of child care, even where no recent work history, higher education, or
vocational training); Greene v. Greene, 634 So. 2d 1286, 1289 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
135. Morgan suggests that courts are more likely to find "voluntary
unemployment" where the parent is staying at home to care for children of a
subsequent marriage, as opposed to children of the parties; and that courts are more
inclined to find a good-faith reason for reducing income where the children being
cared for are disabled, or very young. Morgan, 1995 Update, supra note 50, at 40, 47.
136. Peter H. Nickerson, The WashingtonState Child Support Schedule: Judicial
Discretionand Deviationsfromthe StandardCalculation,26 GONZ. L. REv. 71, 78-80
(1990/91). Nickerson argues for an offset of child care expenses, if income is imputed
to the custodial parent:
The determination of voluntary underemployment or unemployment, and
the estimation of the income which should be available, are very difficult.
This becomes even more so in the case of a custodial parent who could
have more income but decides to stay home, earns less or nothing, and
takes care of the children. If income is going to be imputed to such a
parent, so should the child care expenses. This is because child care would
be necessary to substitute for the parent's care. The expense of this sort of
care can be considerable, especially if more than one child is involved.
Furthermore, the problem does not go away when children reach school age
because of the necessity of after-school care.
Id. at 78-79. For a decision applying an offset of child care expenses against income
imputed to the custodial parent, see In re Marriage of Noel, 875 P.2d 358, 359-60
(Mont. 1994).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/4
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required by labor force participation.'37
Nickerson concluded that
"[e]xtreme care should be taken to avoid situations where imputing income
causes either a parent or the children to be at or near the poverty level, or
results in support payments that leave the children eligible for AFDC
payments from the state."' 38

D. Another Possibility: A Marital/Community Property

Approach to Child Support Calculations
If one accepts the proposition that it is improper, under ordinary
circumstances, to impute income to a custodial parent who stays home with
children, there remains the issue of how to take into account the income
actually available to a caregiving custodial parent who has remarried following
the divorce.'39 Applying the principles of the "partnership" concept of

137. Nickerson uses the Washington case of In re Marriage of Sacco, 784 P.2d
1266 (Wash. 1990) to illustrate the problem. Nickerson, supra note 136, at 79-80. In
Sacco, the court imputed income to the custodial mother, who was working fifteen
hours per week at a child-care job, but made no additional award for child care.
Nickerson, supranote 136, at 79. Nickerson observes that this result forces Ms. Sacco
to choose among undesirable options: she is essentially forced to rely on her exmother-in-law for child care (thereby limiting her ability to relocate for employment
opportunities), or to go on welfare. Nickerson, supra note 136, at 79. Moreover, had
the court imputed day care costs at the same time it imputed income to Ms. Sacco, Mr.
Sacco would actually have ended up paying a larger child support award than he
would if no income had been imputed at all. Nickerson, supra note 136, at 79.
Donigan also reaches the conclusion that if income is to be imputed against the
caregiving parent, the court should consider the cost of day care required for the parent
to work outside the home. Donigan, supra note 37, at 31-34. She observes that it is
unclear whether the court should consider the costs of day care where children from
another relationship are also involved. Donigan, supra note 37, at 34. "In some
instances, if the parent who is unemployed does not have an ability to earn a high
income, it could be more expensive for both parents if the parent obtained outside
employment and a day care obligation resulted." Donigan, supranote 37, at 34 n.139.
Donigan cites the case of In re Marriage of Nolte, 236 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1987), where
a California trial court which had refused to impute income to an unemployed
custodial mother with no employment history was affirmed. Donigan, supra note 37,
at 33 n.130. Imputing income in that case would have reduced the father's child
support obligation, but not have increased the minimal support available to the child,
and the court found imputation of income not in the child's best interests. Id.
138. Nickerson, supra note 136, at 80.
139. Recall that these are the actual facts of Stanton. See supra note 16 and
accompanying text. See infra note 203, concerning unusual situations where imputing
income might be appropriate.
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marriage, it is possible to impute to the custodial parent one-half of the
marital income of the custodial parent and the new spouse.
While this approach does not appear to have been widely adopted, the
principles are not hard to grasp. As Professor Donigan explains,
Shared living arrangements can include cohabitation, remarriage, or even
residence sharing where costs are shared... [S]hared living arrangements
can reduce the parent's expenses, thereby increasing ability to pay. The
resources available to the cohabitant are relevant to the inquiry of the
parent's ability to pay. Although the cohabitant may not have a duty to
support the child, the court may consider the parent's decision of how to
manage the resources available to that parent. Under Washington case law,
the court may consider the new community resources of a parent who
remarries, at least in so far as it affects the parent's ability to pay. 4 '
Donigan notes that a community/marital property approach to calculating
income for child support purposes may operate by attributing one-half of the
total marital income to the custodial spouse,' 4' or may consider the higher

140. Donigan, supra note 37, at 51-52. Donigan qualifies this statement with the
observation that, under Washington case law, "the court may not be able to impute
income to the parent on the basis of the new spouse's earnings." Donigan, supranote
37, at 52 n.240.
Bregande notes that California has moved in this direction, explicitly taking into
account a custodial parent's new spouse's or cohabitant's income in setting child
support obligations, and applauds this development. Bregande, supra note 48, at 14344. Bregande observes Missouri's movement in this direction, Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 452.370.1, see supranote 46, and he encourages incorporation of similar language
into § 452.340. Bregande, supra note 48, at 144-46.
141. Donigan reports that one Wisconsin trial court actually implemented this
approach. Donigan, supra note 37, at 61. Under this method, "if parent A and
[subsequent] spouse Y earned $1,500 and $3,000 per month for a total of $4,500, the
income for A and Y would be half of that or $2,250." Donigan, supra note 37, at 61.
However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the trial court for its use of this
approach in the case of Abitz v. Abitz, 455 N.W.2d 609 (Wis. 1990), holding that the
parent's gross income must be calculated as though the parent were single. Id.
However, Abitz preserved the discretion of the trial courts to consider a
subsequent spouse's income. The court held, as a matter of statutory interpretation,
that marital property principles were not applicable to child support awards. However,
the court concluded by observing that "no restraints are otherwise placed upon the
circuit court's discretion on revision of a child support order to adjust a percentage
calculation in light of the parties' earning capacities and total economic circumstances
as we have defined them herein." Id. at 618. "Total economic circumstances" include
the subsequent spouse's income. Id. at 615. According to the court, "[t]he distinction
between the setting and the satisfaction of a child support award keeps a circuit court's
review of total economic circumstances properly unrestricted by considerations that
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/4
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of either the custodial parent's income or one-half of the community
income.'42 In another variation, one court appears to have considered a
subsequent spouse's income in determining the share of the total support
obligation for which each parent was responsible, but not to change the
amount of the child support obligation.'4 3
Ferguson has observed that Missouri's child support guidelines are not
particularly responsive to the situations and needs of increasingly common
multiple family situations, and has urged Missouri to move in this direction:
The prevalence of multiple families requires accommodating rules. If
guidelines are to create not only adequate, consistent and efficient orders,
but also equitable ones, they must be responsive to the needs of subsequent
families. Missouri could address this need by including the income of
subsequent spouses in the guideline calculation of parental income.' 44
Much of the resistance to this type of reform is likely to be grounded in
the historical refusal to give stepparents an affirmative legal duty of support
for their stepchildren.'45 To formally recognize a marital/community
property approach to child support obligation would openly create such a duty,
since the court would directly apply the subsequent spouse's income to the
support of the children. However, persuasive arguments have been made that
this step would be proper, and that it would amount to only a legal recognition
of existing realities: "Reality and common sense say that the parent gives
priority to the children with whom
he or she lives, regardless of whether they
46
stepchildren."'1
or
natural
are
A colorable argument can be advanced that the necessary authority
already exists in Missouri law for courts to take this step. Missouri's
stepparent support statute, on its face, appears to prevent courts from taking

might otherwise be made of marital property definitions of income." Id.
142. This latter option is highly vulnerable to criticism, as discriminatory against
stepparents. Donigan, supra note 37, at 60-61. Donigan does not report any
jurisdictions where such an approach has been implemented.
143. Donigan, supra note 37, at 61-62.
144. Ferguson, supra note 37, at 1318-19.
145. R. Michael Redman, The Support of Children in Blended Families: A Call
for Change, 25 FAM. L.Q. 83, 83, 92-94 (1991).
146. See generallyRedman, supranote 145. Judge Redman argues in persuasive
and practical terms for the adoption of a legal stepparental duty of support, focusing
on the realities of life in the multiple family situation. He recognizes, however, that
there is opposition to such a reform. See, e.g., Bruch, supra note 37, at 60-61. See
also Donigan, supra note 37, at 59 ("Using a stepparent's income to determine the
parent's support obligation can create a disincentive for a parent's remarriage.").
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this step.' 47 However, the relevant language was enacted in 1977.148 In
1982, the General Assembly appears to have reconsidered the matter,
incorporating the following language into Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.370, governing
modification of child support awards:
In a proceeding for modification of any child support or maintenance
award, the court, in determining whether or not a substantial change in
circumstances has occurred, shall consider all financial resources of both
parties, includingthe extent to which the reasonableexpenses ofeitherparty
are, or should be, sharedby a spouse or otherperson with whom he or she

cohabits, and the eaming capacity of a party who is not employed.

9

To the extent the two statutes conflict, the later must be presumed to control.
It does not require a strained reading of the statute to conclude that the
"reasonable expenses of either party" are likely to include expenses of the
household, including those incurred in rearing children. Thus, to the extent
that it is "reasonable" for a husband and wife to function as an economic
partnership, sharing in both the wealth and the expenses of the household, the
stepparent support statute's bar on consideration of the subsequent spouse's
income in child support calculations 5 ' may no longer be "good law." If so,

147. The stepparent support statute, Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.400 (1994), provides
in relevant part:
1. A stepparent shall support his or her stepchild to the same extent that
a natural or adoptive parent is required to support his or her child so long
as the stepchild is living in the same home as the stepparent. However,
nothing in this section shall be construed as abrogating or in any way
diminishing the duty a parent otherwise would have to provide child
support, and no court shall consider the income of a stepparent, or the
amount actually provided for a stepchild by a stepparent, in determining the
amount of child support to be paid by a natural or adoptive parent.
2. A natural or adoptive parent shall be liable to a stepparent for the sum
of money expended by a stepparent for the support of a stepchild when that
sum of money was expended because of the neglect or refusal ofthe natural
or adoptive parent to pay any part of or all of the court-ordered amount of
support.
3. This section shall not abrogate or diminish the common law right
which a stepparent may possess to recover from a natural or adoptive parent
the expense of providing necessaries for a stepchild in the absence of a
court order for child support determining the amount of support to be paid
by a natural or adoptive parent.
148. Id.
149. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.370.1 (1994) (emphasis added).
150. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.400.1 (1994).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/4
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there is no statutory bar to adoption by the courts of a marital/community
property approach to child support calculations in Missouri.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, Mother first argued on appeal that there was no
evidence of a change in the parties' financial circumstances sufficient to
warrant modification of child support.' The court relied on Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 452.370.1,152 which together with Rule 88.01,153 governs modification
of child support awards, in disposing of this argument. The court observed
that Mother's husband's "income alone is more than father and mother
previously earned together," and that this is a relevant factor under
§ 452.370.1.154 Moreover, the statute directs the court to consider "the
earning capacity of a party who is not employed;" given the trial court's
finding that Mother's average earnings for the previous three years was
$100,935, the court held that the trial court properly considered Mother's
earning capacity in determining that a "change in circumstances" had
occurred. 5 The court concluded that, taking into account Mother's earning
capacity and Mother's present husband's income, there was no error in the
of a "substantial and continuing change in
trial court's finding
56
circumstances."1
Mother then argued the primary issue, contending that the trial court
erred in imputing income to her pursuant to Form 14. i1 7 "She assert[ed] that
in calculating child support, income may not be imputed to a custodial parent
who chooses to stay home with minor children of the marriage. '
The court began its analysis by observing that Missouri courts had
previously imputed income in two situations: "where noncustodial parents
failed to use their best efforts to secure employment to meet a child support60
obligation,"'5 9 and "where a lethargic spouse receives maintenance.'

151. Stanton, 874 S.W.2d at 497.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See supra note 46.
See supra note 43.
Stanton, 874 S.W.2d at 497.
Id.
Id.
Id See supra note 44.
Stanton, 874 S.W.2d at 497.

159. Id.(citing Overstreet v. Overstreet, 693 S.W.2d 242, 246 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985)).

(citing Oldfield v. Oldfield, 767 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)).
160. Id.
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The court noted that Missouri courts had never imputed income to a custodial
parent who chose to stay home to care for minor children.""
The court found it significant that while historically, the father had been
assigned the primary legal duty of support for children, the legislature had
repealed the father's primary responsibility of support as a factor to be
considered in establishing child support awards in 1988; and the current
version of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.340 does not mention the "father's primary
responsibility."'"
The court further observed that "this shift in
responsibility is reflected in Rule 88.01 and Form 14. These require the trial
court to63 consider the income of both the custodial and noncustodial
1
parent.

The court further emphasized the directions for use of Form 14,
worksheet line 1, which provide that "If either parent is unemployed or
underemployed, child support may be calculated in appropriatecircumstances
based on a determination of potential income.'"" The court must consider
"whether [the unemployed or underemployed] parent is custodian of a child
whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not
be required to seek employment outside the home."'6
However, no
particular result is mandated as a result of this consideration.'"
The court recognized that only one previous Missouri case, Markowski
v. Markowski,67 had discussed imputing income to a custodial parent.'68
There, the appellate court upheld elimination of the ex-wife's maintenance
award, but reversed the trial court's reduction of child support with the
observation that income imputed to a custodial parent is not a tangible
resource for the children. 69 The court then distinguished Markowski on its
facts, observing that in the earlier case, mother had not worked for nine years,
and started a business after the dissolution, in which she lost money the first

161. Id.
162. Id at 497-98; see supra notes 42, 49 and accompanying text.
163. Stanton, 874 S.W.2d at 498.
164. Id. (emphasis court's); see supra note 44.
165. Stanton, 874 S.W.2d at 498; see supra note 44.
166. Stanton, 874 S.W.2d at 498. (referring to King v. King, 865 S.W.2d 403,
405 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)).
167. 736 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). See supra notes 57-61 and
accompanying text.
168. Stanton, 874 S.W.2d at 498.
169. Id (citing Markowski, 736 S.W.2d at 465-66, and quoting the language used
by the court there with regard to imputing income to a custodial parent for child
support purposes). See supranotes 57-61 and accompanying text for the language of
Markowski.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/4

34

1996]

DeMarce: DeMarce: Devaluing Caregiving in Child Support Calculations:
CHILD SUPPORTCALCULATIONS

three years. 70 "There is no indication that mother had gainful employment
from 1979 to the time father's motion to modify was heard in November,
The court further noted that Missouri Revised Statute § 452.340
1986."'
(1986) (repealed 1988) at that time still placed primary responsibility for child
support on the father, although recognizing that Markowski did not mention
that statute in its opinion. 72 Contrasting Markowski with the instant case,
the court noted Mother's work history, her earnings, and her having been
"gainfully employed" through the birth of her four children. 73
The court then turned to an examination of the practice in other states
174
regarding whether a trial court may impute income to a custodial parent.
Citing Canning v. Juskalian,175 the court noted that in Massachusetts, the
trial court may consider the potential earning capacity of the party, taking into
consideration "the education, training, and past employment history of the
party."' 176 However, the guidelines there do not "apply to a custodial parent
with children who are under the age of six living in the home."'7 Canning
noted that imputing income should be approached with "realistic caution," and
recognized the presence of factors both favoring and disfavoring imputation
of income. 7 8
The court also discussed Stredny v. Gray,179 where a Pennsylvania court
recognized that "the child care contributions of an unemployed, nurturing
parent are important, and [their court had] stated that an unemployed,
nurturing parent should not be expected to find employment to advance a

170. Stanton, 874 S.W.2d at 498.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id
174. Id. at 498-99.
175. 597 N.E.2d 1074, 1077 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
176. Stanton, 874 S.W.2d at 498 (citing Canning,597 N.E.2d at 1077).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 498-99 (citing Canning, 597 N.E.2d at 1077 nn.8 & 9). Factors
identified by the Canning court as favoring non-attribution of income included and
cited in the instant decision included "(1) giving priority to the 'nurturing parent'
doctrine, (2) not punishing children for their parents' actions, (3) avoiding the creation
of economic disincentives to remarriage and the rearing of children, and (4)
recognizing that the income generated by attribution is often fictional, and therefore,
of no benefit to the children." Factors cited as favoring attribution included "(1)
minimizing the economic impact of family breakup on children by discouraging
parental unemployment or underemployment, and (2) recognizing that staying at home
to care for children may constitute volitional unemployment." Canning,597 N.E.2d
at 1077 n.9.
179. 510 A.2d 359, 363 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
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child's economic welfare at the expense o the child's emotional welfare."'8 0
The court there refused to impute income to the mother.'
The instant
court stressed the facts present in that case, in which the parties' child was
attending a school for emotionally disturbed children, and mother had a three
and one-half year-old child by her present husband.'
Finally, the court considered some "pertinent" comments from the New
Jersey case of Thomas v. Thomas,8 3 where the mother was caring for the
two children of the parties, ages 11 and 7, and for her children by her present
husband, ages 3 and two months. 4 Thomas noted that imputing income was
permitted, but not required.'
"The [Thomas] court further observed, '[I]t
is important to note that [mother] is not unemployed. She is employed on a
full-time basis as a care giver to her young
children. This employment is,
' 86
however, not compensated monetarily. "
Based on its review of these authorities, the court concluded that trial
courts have discretion to impute income to an unemployed or underemployed
custodial parent, emphasizing that such imputing should occur only in
"appropriate circumstances.' 87
While noting that "appropriate
circumstances" vary on a case-by-case basis, the court stated that the factors
previously mentioned in the opinion should be considered, along with the
following:
(1) the age, maturity, health, and number of children in the home; (2) the
custodial parent's employment history, including recency of employment
and earnings, as well as the availability of suitable employment; (3)the age
and health of the custodial parent; (4) the availability of appropriate childcare givers; (5) the relationship between the expense of child-care givers
and the net income the custodial parent would receive; (6) the cost, if any,
for transportation, suitable clothing, and other items required for the
custodial parent to have the imputed employment; (7)the custodial parent's
motivation or reasons for being at home; and (8) the adequacy of available
resources if the custodial parent remains at home.'

180. Stanton, 874 S.W.2d at 499 (citing Stredny, 510 A.2d at 363).
181. Id.
182. Id. The court mentioned as presenting a similar situation the Colorado case
of In re Marriage of Pote, 847 P.2d 246 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993), in which it was held
that the trial court erred in imputing income on a full-time basis to a mother of a fouryear-old child with Down's syndrome. Id.
183. 589 A.2d 1372, 1373 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991).
184. Stanton, 874 S.W.2d at 499 (citing Thomas, 589 A.2d at 1373).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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Applying the factors, the court noted the children's ages, good health, and
good school records. 89 The court stressed that Mother was "a highly trained
physician, with an internal medicine specialty," and noted her past earnings
and intention to obtain a California medical license.' 9° The court further
observed that "while a single parent in St. Louis, mother had a full time
housekeeper at a cost of $1,800 per month. It is clear that from a financial
view, mother's potential income greatly exceeds the financial expenses she
would incur in working."' 9' The court reviewed Mother's stated reasons for
staying home, and observed that the adequacy of available resources was not
a significant issue in this case, regardless of whether Mother stayed home. 92
Based on the "totality of the record," the court held that there was no abuse
of discretion by the trial court in imputing income to Mother on these facts. 93

189. Id.
190. Id. at 499-500.
191. Id.at 500.
192. Id.See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
193. Stanton, 874 S.W.2d at 500. The full impact of Stanton on Missouri child
support practice is not yet clear. No clear pattern emerges in the four subsequent
Missouri cases which have addressed the issue of imputing income to a custodial
parent.
In Adelman v. Adelman, 878 S.W.2d 871 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994), a different panel
of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, without referring to Stanton,
refused to impute income to a custodial mother where, although she was trained as a
radiological technician, she had been out of the job market for ten years, she had a
medical condition which would have made it dangerous for her to work, and the three
minor children had seizure disorders which made additional supervision appropriate.
Id.at 872, 874-75. The court relied on Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.335, concerning
maintenance awards, indicating maintenance is appropriate where the spouse seeking
maintenance "is unable to support himself through appropriate employment or is the
custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the
custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home."
Id.at 873 (emphasis court's).
In re Marriage of Braun, 887 S.W.2d 776 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994), a different panel
of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, without referring to Stanton, upheld
a trial court which refused to impute income to a custodial mother where mother had
stayed home throughout the eight-year marriage, was given custody of three young
children, and prior to the marriage had worked only at "minimum wage jobs which she
held for a short time." Id.at 778-79.
In Jones v. Jones, 903 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), the Missouri Court of
Appeals, Western District, while not reaching the issue of imputing income to a
custodial mother, cited Stanton and suggested strongly in dicta that imputing income
would be proper. Id.at 284. There the custodial mother, a licensed nurse who had
not worked outside the home since the birth of the first of three children in 1984,
moved with her new husband to South Carolina (where she was not licensed); the
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V. COMMENT

The practice of imputing income to a custodial parent who chooses to
stay at home with minor children raises questions going to the heart of our
legal and societal values. To conclude that a parent who chooses to stay at
home with children is "voluntarily unemployed or underemployed," a court
must implicitly find a parent's work in the home to be of lesser worth than
employment in the marketplace, or that it is not work at all. The Stanton
court's decision to rewrite the law of child support in Missouri to allow this
practice was unnecessary and unjustified. While Stanton may not seem a bad
result on its facts, a similar result could have been reached equitably without
opening the door to imputation of income to custodial parents in other
situations.
To reach its holding, Stanton disregarded precedent and engaged in a
questionable interpretation of the statutes and court rules governing child
support. The court's effort to distinguish Markowski on its facts is
unconvincing. Rather than being decided on its facts, Markowski stood for the
proposition that it simply is not appropriate to impute income to a custodial
parent for purposes of child support, on the ground that the income thus
imputed was of no tangible benefit to the child(ren)., 4
In addition, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.370.1,9' Rule 88.01,96 and Form
14"97 do not necessarily have the impact ascribed to them by the court. The
directions for completing Form 14, Worksheet line 1 provides that "[i]f either

move did not achieve an economic advantage for either of them, but was based largely
on a desire to distance herself from the children's father. Id. at 279-84.
In Woolsey v. Woolsey, 904 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), another different
panel of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, cited the Stanton multi-factor
test, but deferred to a trial court which had refused to impute income of more than
$1,000 per month to a custodial mother who had custody of one fourteen-year-old
child, was trained as a speech pathologist, but had not worked outside the home since
1980. Id. at 99-100. The court observed that "[i]n a marriage where the wife relies
on the husband for monetary support, and is out of the marketplace, thereby injuring
her marketable skills, this type of reliance may warrant an award of maintenance." Id
at 99.
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, does not appear to have yet
addressed the issue. (But see Cooper v. Cooper, 893 S.W.2d 839, 841-42 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995) (declining to review trial court's failure to impute income to mother with
custody of a one-year-old child on resjudicatagrounds)). No cases on point have yet
been decided by the Missouri Supreme Court.
194. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 46.
196. See supra note 43.
197. See supra note 44.
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parent is unemployed or underemployed, child support may be calculated in
198
appropriate circumstances based on a determination of potential income."'
While Stanton read this as "requir[ing]" the court to consider the income of
both the custodial and noncustodial parent, 99 a more natural reading of the
form in light of settled legal principles would have required the opposite
result.
Prior to Stanton, no Missouri court had ever imputed income to a
custodial parent."'
"Statutes should be construed in the light of the
common law rules in force at the time of their passage..., and in a way that
synchronizes their meaning with existing common law." '0 ' Construing the
rules2" in light of the common law, it would appear that "either parent"
more probably refers to "eitherthe father or the mother," rather than to "both
the custodial and noncustodial parent." Moreover, "appropriate circumstances"
and "voluntarily unemployed or underemployed" would be construed, virtually
per se, not to apply to a custodial parent staying home with children.0 3

198. Mo. Civ. P. FORM NO. 14, Directions for Completion of Form 14,
Worksheet line 1.
199. Stanton, 874 S.W.2d at 498.
200. Id. at 497.
201. Bishop v. Cummines, 870 S.W.2d 922, 924 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (citations
omitted).
202. The Missouri Supreme Court's rulemaking authority is found in Mo. CONST.
Art. V, § 5, and Mo. REV. STAT. § 477.010 (1994). "Supreme court rules govern over
contradictory statutes in procedural matters unless the General Assembly specifically
annuls or amends the rules in a bill limited to that purpose." Ostermueller v. Potter,
868 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Mo. 1993) (en banc). "The rules of construction are the same
for supreme court rules and legislative enactments." State v. Windmiller, 579 S.W.2d
730, 732 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
203. The Stanton decision places Missouri among the jurisdictions which permit
trial courts to decide whether to impute income to a custodial parent based on a caseby-case analysis of the "totality of the circumstances." See supra notes 130-35 and
accompanying text. Such a posture denigrates the importance of the caregiving role,
by forcing a caregiver-parent tojustify to the court why he/she should not be penalized
for making a full-time commitment to family care.
Although the presumption against imputing income to a custodial parent who is
engaged in full-time caregiving should be very strong, I am not willing to argue for
an absolute rule to this effect. Family courts need some measure of discretion, in
order to respond to the unique situations with which they are presented. See generally
Schneider, supra note 39. It is possible to hypothesize a custodial parent who has
reduced income entirely for "bad faith" reasons, where the facts may indicate that the
parent is not in fact engaging in the caregiving function. The principal point is that
full-time caregiving itself should never be considered a "bad-faith" motivation for
reducing earned income.
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There is no unequivocal evidence on the face of the statute or of the supreme
court rule indicating an intent to overrule the common law on this point.2"
It is also far from clear that the General Assembly's repeal of the
"father's primary duty to support" had the effect implied by Stanton of making
proper the imputation of income to a custodial parent. The mother is not the
custodial parent in all cases.2" 5 While repeal of the father's primary duty of
support might logically mandate the conclusion that income could be imputed
in appropriate circumstances to a noncustodial parent, whether male or
female,2" it does not follow that custodial and noncustodial parents are
similarly situated, or that imputation of income to a custodial parent is
required.
Stanton is also vulnerable to criticism on broader grounds of public
policy. A judicial determination that a parent staying at home with minor
children is "voluntarily unemployed or underemployed" carries with it a
powerful value judgment about the relative worth of different roles in our
society. Such a determination, in addition to denigrating the hard work of
those who raise children, ignores the eloquent pleas for recognition of the
caregiving role made by commentators in the field such as Estin and
Laughrey." 7 Moreover, it is inconsistent with the progress the law has
made toward recognizing the value of the caregiving function in such diverse
areas as wrongful death, 03 equitable property distribution upon divorce," 9
and the law of decedents' estates.21°
If the doctor/mother in the instant case is truly "underemployed," then the
law has concluded that it is more valuable in our society to be a doctor than
a full-time parent.2 ' This questionable proposition cannot be tested

204. The argument that the common law was overruled is even weaker
considering Missouri's history ofproviding caregiver maintenance awards where small
children are involved. See supranotes 69-71 and accompanying text.
205. See generallyLYDIA SCOON-ROGERS & GORDON H. LESTER, U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHILD SUPPORT FOR CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND

FATHERS (1991) (providing recent statistics on child custody and support).
206. See In re Marriage of Garrison, 846 S.W.2d 771, 776 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)
(appearing to interpret the statute as extending the duty of support to both noncustodial
mothers and fathers).
207. See supra notes 91-99, 118 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 111.
209. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
211. Stanton, with its emphasis on what the custodial mother could potentially
have earned in the workplace, in comparison to her monetary costs for full-time child
care, and its emphasis on child care costs and availability in the multi-factor test,
contains an implicit suggestion that whenever the custodial parent can realize a net
financial gain by working outside the home rather than in it, he/she should do so, all
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/4
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empirically, and such a judgment, if it is to be made at all, should come only
from the clear command of the legislative branch. The common law of
Missouri, and present statutes and court rules, do not require it.2
One ground on which a court could rest the decision to impute income
to a custodial parent is that the child support award is supposed to reflect, in
part, "the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage
not been dissolved,"2 3 and that child support policies should thus encourage
both parents to earn at least as much as they had prior to the dissolution. This
goal might seem to require imputation of income to a custodial parent with a
substantial past earnings history, as was the case in Stanton. However, to
apply this factor so strictly ignores the real value to children of the caregiving
function, and also requires the court to engage in speculation as to what would
have occurred had the marriage not been dissolved.
In the Stanton scenario, it is possible that if the first marriage had
remained intact, Mother would have stayed in her medical practice and
continued to produce earnings comparable to the prior few years. However,
it is also possible that she might have decided to stay home with the four
children anyway, or to voluntarily reduce her income by volunteering her
medical skills for the poor or for international religious missions. Such
actions are widely considered laudable in our society. Had she made such a
decision, the cost of the reduced income would have been spread over the
entire family unit-Mother, Father, and the children. It certainly may not be
argued that Father could have compelled her to stay in her prior job if she was
miserably unhappy with it, or even if she simply was ready for a change.
Implying such a power of one marital partner over the other does not comport
with our modem understanding of marriage.
While the "standard of living had the marriage not been dissolved" factor
may have appropriate application to a parent who in "bad faith" reduces
his/her income to evade a child support obligation, it is inequitable to apply

other factors being equal. See Stanton, 874 S.W.2d at 499-500. This viewpoint
ignores the noneconomic, yet valuable, contributions to the family made by a full-time
caregiver.
212. The relevant statutes and court rules, on their face, appear to be sufficiently
broadly written to permit imputation of income to custodial parents. See supra notes
42-44. However, this result is not explicitly required,and both conventional principles
of statutory interpretation and considerations of public policy advise against reaching
it.
213. Mo. Sup. Cr. R. 88.01(c). The difficulties in determining "the standard of
living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved" and in
setting child support accordingly, and the tendency of courts to interpret this, at a
minimum, to preserve the pre-dissolution standard of living, are discussed in Leehy,
supra note 36, at 1322-30. But see Bruch, supranote 37, at 63-64, arguing that such
judicial predictions about the future are necessary and justified.
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it to a parent who makes the worthy choice to devote full-time efforts to the
household and children. Courts should acknowledge that "standard of living"
is a multi-faceted concept, and that full-time caregiving involves not merely
financial costs, but also substantial tangible benefits, to the children.
Even if the importance of the caregiving role is fully appreciated, the
thesis that income should not be imputed to a custodial parent who stays home
with children can be attacked on the ground that it ignores the real benefits a
custodial parent obtains from caregiving and regular interaction with
children." 4 However, this argument ignores an important reality of the
world of work. Many people, not only full-time caregivers, find great
satisfaction in their careers.2" 5 However, it is unlikely that serious proposals
would be made to impute additional income to a doctor, carpenter, or plant
manager on the basis of the substantial, unquantifiable rewards which such
persons may obtain from their careers. To penalize only caregivers for the
intangible benefits of productive work perpetuates unhelpful stereotypes about
the value about work in the home in relation to work in the marketplace.
Work is work, regardless of the setting in which it occurs. 1 6
Despite all of the foregoing, the conclusion seems inescapable that
Stanton is not a bad result on its facts. The children who were the subjects
of the action were living in a household with an annual income of $225,000
at the time of the motion to modify. 217 Clearly, Stanton does not present the
typical situation in which a great financial stress is imposed on the parties as
the result of a dissolution.2 8
It was appropriate to impute income to Mother in Stanton, but not for the
reasons elaborated by the court. The court could have reached a similar result
by imputing to Mother one-half of the income of her present household,

214. See supra note 122.
215. It is widely observed that many women who are not financially forced to
enter the labor force do so anyway, precisely because of the greater satisfaction they
believe can be obtained through employment outside the home.
216. The caregiving parent is fully employed, with zero earned income. Zero is
thus the appropriate amount to be entered on the "monthly gross income" line of Form
14. See supra note 44.
217. Stanton, 874 S.W.2d at 497.
218. Imputing income to a custodial parent is clearly least justifiable as a matter
of policy where doing so will impoverish the children in his/her care, by substantially
reducing the noncustodial parent's obligation. See supra notes 137-38 and
accompanying text. As the Markoivski court noted, income imputed to a custodial
parent is not a tangible resource to the children. 736 S.W.2d at 466. See supra note
61.
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thereby avoiding the need to implicitly devalue the caregiving function she
was performing.219
In situations like the instant case, where one or both of the parents have
remarried, adoption of a community/marital property approach to computing
income for child support calculations220 would both uphold the ideals of the
"partnership" concept of marriage and comport with the practical realities of
" ' To the extent
allocation of resources in subsequent-marriage households.22
Missouri courts may not be able to explicitly adopt such an approach," 2 the
General Assembly should provide authorization to do so. In the meantime,
given the broad statutory language, 2" courts should be able to reach similar
results by considering the effect of the total income of the new household on
the parent's total financial situation. 24
Upholding the values of caregiving requires careful, conscious attention
to the impacts of legal rules and presumptions. The case of imputing income
to a custodial parent-caregiver presents a dramatic example of a policy choice
to either recognize, or denigrate, the importance of the caregiving role. "Our
most difficult task may also be the simplest: to affirm that family life is still
a matter of deep personal importance and valid legal concern." 25
KARL A.W. DEMARCE

219. While noting the relevance of Mother's present husband's income to the
issue of finding a "change in circumstances," the Stanton court did not rest its
imputation of income on that basis. Stanton, 874 S.W.2d at 497-500.
220. See supranotes 139-43 and accompanying text. This Note recommends the
approach of taking the total marital income, and imputing one-half of that amount to
the parent subject to the action, as the approach which best upholds the "partnership"
conception of marriage and which best comports with the practical realities of use of
resources in subsequent-marriage households.
221. See generallyLaughrey, supra note 62; Redman, supra note 145.
222. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
223. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.370.1. See supranote 46.
224. See supra note 141.
225. Estin, supra note 64, at 803.
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